United Nations S/2014/113

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 February 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 19 February 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to transmit the attached letter dated 7 February 2014 from the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Alexander Vershbow, transmitting the quarterly report on the international security presence in Kosovo, covering the period from 1 October to 31 December 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

In accordance with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I attach a report on the operations of the Kosovo Force covering the period from 1 October to 31 December 2013.

I would appreciate your making this report available to the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Vershbow**

Enclosure

Report to the United Nations on the operations of the Kosovo Force

Introduction

1. The present report on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and covers the period from 1 October to 31 December 2013.

2. As at 31 December 2013, the total number of KFOR troops in theatre remained approximately 5,000.

3. The reporting period was characterized by the municipal elections that took place on 3 and 17 November for the first round, as well as on 1 December 2013 for the second round and a partial re-run in Zvečan.

Security situation and operations

4. During the reporting period, the security situation in theatre remained calm in the southern part of Kosovo and reasonably stable in the northern part of Kosovo. The implementation of the European Union-facilitated agreement of 19 April 2013 on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, including the election campaign for the Kosovo-wide municipal elections, dominated the operating environment of KFOR during the reporting period. Against such positive developments, the KFOR mission to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement continued as part of the comprehensive international effort.

5. The pre-election period was generally calm and stable, without major security incidents or violent opposition to the overall election campaign. The first round of the Kosovo municipal elections on 3 November 2013 was affected by disruptions at three polling centres in Mitrovica, which required the polling to be repeated at those locations on 17 November 2013. Because the necessary majority was not achieved in a number of municipalities on 3 November 2013, a second round of voting was held in 25 municipalities on 1 December 2013, as well as a partial re-run in Zvečan. The conduct of the second round of local elections was mostly peaceful and without major security incidents.

6. KFOR, in its capacity as third responder, continued to maintain its capability to pre-empt and respond effectively to disruptions to both a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement. The main focus of KFOR was on the security situation during the municipal elections period, working in close coordination with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). KFOR remained ready to provide immediate intervention if required with a main focus on Mitrovica North and Zvečan. KFOR forces also maintained full situational awareness in the remaining municipalities in the southern part of Kosovo through an established system of patrols and reaction forces. Apart from the first round of elections, when disruptions at three polling centres in Mitrovica occurred, there was no requirement for direct intervention by KFOR during the reporting period.

7. Following the outcome of the working groups on the implementation of the European Union-facilitated agreement, tax collection at Gate 1 and DOG 31 in the northern part of Kosovo started according to plan and without incidents on 14 December 2013.

Summary

8. During the reporting period, KFOR, in its capacity as third responder, contributed to maintaining both a safe and secure environment and ensuring freedom of movement in close coordination with EULEX and the Kosovo Police. The close coordination on the ground between KFOR, EULEX and the Kosovo Police was highly effective in supporting OSCE during the recent municipal elections. This showed the ability of these three actors to monitor the security situation closely, maintain an appropriate deterrent posture and react quickly and decisively when required.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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20 February 2014

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 18 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 14 February 2014, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 18 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 30 January 2014, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the Security Council (A/68/735-S/2014/71), which yet again contains false allegations similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to underline that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and permission of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. Similarly, the accusation raised in the above-mentioned letter in relation to Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This constitutes yet another attempt aimed at distorting the facts and the realities of the island. As noted in our previous letters, such assertions are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious assertion by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As for the repeated false claims regarding the Ercan airport in the North, it should be once again underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre (ACC) and airport in North Cyprus have been providing successful and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island in line with its isolation policy imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) take place with the full knowledge and consent of the TRNC Civil Aviation Department over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

The TRNC legislation on aeronautical safety reflects all International Civil Aviation Organization standards and recommendations, providing safe, regular and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport as well as using TRNC airspace. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years and the Ercan ACC is in constant and close cooperation with the Ankara ACC in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. The Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full

conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944 and is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false accounts, to confer legitimacy upon the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed contribute to a better atmosphere on the island is for the Greek Cypriot side to stop claiming for itself the rights and responsibilities it does not legally have and to cease its hostile and derogatory acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of Turkish Cypriot rights in the north of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call on the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue its well-known propaganda tactics and focus on the full-fledged negotiations conducted under your good offices mission for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus without further delay. As the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to continue to maintain our constructive and positive stance and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2014/115

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 February 2014

Original: English

Australia, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012) and 2118 (2013), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012 and 2 October 2013,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Being appalled at the unacceptable and escalating level of violence and the death of well over 100,000 people in Syria, including over 10,000 children, as reported by the United Nations Secretary-General and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,

Expressing grave alarm at the significant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria, in particular the dire situation of hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in besieged areas, most of whom are besieged by the Syrian armed forces and some by opposition groups, as well as the dire situation of over 3 million people in hard-to-reach areas, and *deploring* the difficulties in providing, and the failure to provide, access for the humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need inside Syria,

Emphasizing the need to respect the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance and stressing the importance of such assistance being delivered on the basis of need, devoid of any political prejudices and aims, *commending* the efforts of the United Nations and all humanitarian and medical personnel in Syria and in neighbouring countries, and *condemning* all acts or threats of violence against United Nations staff and humanitarian actors, which have resulted in the death, injury and detention of many humanitarian personnel,

Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons caused by the conflict in Syria, which has a destabilizing impact on the entire region, and *underscoring* its appreciation for the significant and admirable efforts that have been made by the countries of the region, notably Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, to accommodate the more than 2.4 million refugees who have fled Syria as a result of the ongoing violence, while acknowledging the enormous political, socioeconomic and financial impact of the

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presence of large-scale populations in these countries, and *underscoring* the need for all parties to respect and maintain the security and civilian character of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons,

Welcoming the pledges totalling $2.5 billion at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, hosted by Kuwait on 15 January 2014, and *expressing its appreciation* to Member States and regional and subregional organizations that have pledged to provide humanitarian assistance to people in need in all parts of Syria, including internally displaced persons, as well as to refugees in neighbouring host countries, and *calling on* all Member States to ensure the timely disbursement of pledges and continued support in line with growing humanitarian needs,

Calling on all parties to immediately end all violence which has led to human suffering in Syria, save Syria's rich societal mosaic and cultural heritage, and take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of Syria's World Heritage Sites,

Strongly condemning the increased terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties and destruction carried out by organizations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups, and *reiterating* its call on all parties to commit to putting an end to terrorist acts perpetrated by such organizations and individuals, *while reaffirming* that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed,

Expressing its regret that its Presidential Statement of 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15) has not delivered as expected and has not yet translated into meaningful progress on the ground, and that humanitarian aid delivery continues to be impeded throughout Syria, while *condemning* all cases of denial of humanitarian access and *recalling* that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and access, can constitute a violation of international humanitarian law,

Emphasizing that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution to the crisis, *reiterating* its endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II of resolution 2118 (2113)) and *demanding* that all parties work towards the immediate and comprehensive implementation of the Geneva Communiqué aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence, violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international law, and facilitating the Syrian-led political process launched in Monteux on 22 January 2014, leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future,

1. *Strongly condemns* the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as all grave violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape, attacks on schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment and use as

human shields, as described in the United Nations Secretary-General's report on children and armed conflict in Syria (S/2014/31);

2. *Demands* that all parties immediately put an end to all forms of violence, irrespective of where it comes from, cease and desist from all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and reaffirm their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and *stresses* that some of these violations may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity;

3. *Demands* that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs, and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and *recalls* in this regard the obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law in all circumstances, and further *recalls*, in particular, the obligation to distinguish between civilian populations and combatants, and the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, and attacks against civilians and civilian objects as such;

4. *Demands* that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, fully implement the provisions of the 2 October 2013 Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2013/15) including through facilitating the expansion of humanitarian relief operations, in accordance with applicable provisions of international humanitarian law and the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance;

5. *Calls* upon all parties to immediately lift the sieges of populated areas, including in the Old City of Homs (Homs), Nub and Zahra (Aleppo), Madam yet Elisha (Rural Damascus), Armour (Damascus), Eastern Gout (Rural Damascus), Drays (Rural Damascus) and other locations, and *demands* that all parties allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance, cease depriving civilians of food and medicine indispensable to their survival, and enable the rapid, safe and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who wish to leave, and *underscores* the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria, recalling that starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited by international humanitarian law;

6. *Demands* that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders, in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through the most direct routes;

7. *Urges* all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate steps to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and all humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities, to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the affected people in Syria, including by promptly facilitating safe and unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need of assistance in all areas under their control, and *encourages* further cooperation between the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all parties

concerned, including Syrian civil society organizations, to facilitate access and the delivery of assistance in the entirety of the Syrian territory;

8. *Demands* that all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality and facilitate free passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment, transport and supplies, including surgical items, and *recalls* that under international humanitarian law, the wounded and sick must receive, to the fullest extent practicable, and with the least possible delay, medical care and attention required by their condition and that medical and humanitarian personnel, facilities and transport must be respected and protected, and *expresses grave concern* in this regard at the removal of medical supplies from humanitarian shipments;

9. *Also demands* that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of ethnic, religious and confessional communities, and *stresses* that, in this regard, the primary responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities;

10. *Further demands* that all parties demilitarize medical facilities, schools and other civilian facilities and avoid establishing military positions in populated areas and desist from attacks directed against civilian objects;

11. *Strongly condemns* the arbitrary detention and torture of civilians in Syria, notably in prisons and detention facilities, as well as the kidnappings, abductions and forced disappearances, and *demands* the immediate end of these practices and the release of all arbitrarily detained persons starting with women and children, as well as sick, wounded and elderly people and including United Nations personnel and journalists;

12. *Urges* all parties to take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, those of its specialized agencies, and all other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief activities, without prejudice to their freedom of movement and access, *stresses* that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities and *further stresses* the need not to impede these efforts;

13. *Stresses* the need to end impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and *reaffirms* that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in Syria must be brought to justice;

14. *Strongly condemns* the increased terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties and destruction carried out by organizations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups, *urges* the opposition groups to maintain their rejection of these organizations and individuals which are responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in opposition-held areas, *calls upon* the Syrian authorities and opposition groups to commit to combating and defeating organizations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups, *demands* that all foreign fighters immediately withdraw from Syria, and *reaffirms* that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed;

15. *Emphasizes* that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution, *welcomes* in this regard the Geneva Conference on Syria launched in Monteux on 22 January 2014, and *demands* that all parties work towards the comprehensive implementation of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 leading to a genuine political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future, and *further stresses* that rapid progress on a political solution should include full participation by all groups and segments of Syrian society, including women, and represents the only sustainable opportunity to resolve the situation in Syria peacefully, and that the implementation of this resolution is key to meeting the humanitarian needs of the Syrian people;

16. *Urges* all Member States to contribute or increase their support to the United Nations humanitarian appeals to meet the spiralling needs of people affected by the crisis, and to provide this support in coordination with the relevant United Nations agencies, and to ensure that all pledges are honoured in full, and *further urges* all Member States, based on burden-sharing principles, to support the neighbouring host countries to enable them to respond to the growing humanitarian needs, including by providing direct support;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution by all parties in Syria, in particular paragraphs 2 through 12, in 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter, and upon receipt of the Secretary-General's report, *expresses* its intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance with this resolution;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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3 March 2014

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President circulates herewith the report of the Director General dated 20 February 2014 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 20 February 2014 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed report (see enclosure) to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Report by the Director General

Main Developments

- Iran has implemented the six initial practical measures that it agreed with the Agency in November 2013 in relation to the Framework for Cooperation and both parties have agreed on the next seven practical measures to be implemented by Iran by 15 May 2014, including one measure related to the information contained in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report.

- On 24 November 2013, the E3+3 and Iran agreed on a Joint Plan of Action (JPA). The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014, and the Board of Governors endorsed the Agency undertaking monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out therein (see Annex III).

- Enrichment of UF_6above 5% U-235 is no longer taking place at PFEP and FFEP. The amount of nuclear material that remains in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 is 160.6 kg. A proportion of this material is being downblended and the remainder is being converted to uranium oxide.

- Enrichment of UF_6up to 5% U-235 continues at a rate of production similar to that indicated in the Director General's previous report. No additional IR-2m or IR-1 centrifuges have been installed at FEP, FFEP or PFEP (production area). The amount of nuclear material that remains in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 is 7609 kg.

- An updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor has been provided to the Agency. No additional major components have been installed at this reactor and there has been no manufacture and testing of fuel for the reactor.

- Managed access has been provided to the Agency to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.

* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/2014/10.

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement[1] and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It also contains information regarding the implementation of measures under the "Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation" (the Framework for Cooperation) and the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), including an Annex which provides an update on the implementation of "voluntary measures" that Iran has agreed to undertake in relation to the JPA.

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions[2] are binding on Iran.[3] The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions[4] were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.[5] The full implementation of Iran's obligations is needed in order to ensure international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

3. As previously reported, on 11 November 2013 the Agency and Iran signed a "Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation"(GOV/INF/2013/14). In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceedwith such activities in a step by step manner.

4. In a separate development, on 24 November 2013 China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (E3+3) agreed on the JPAwith Iran in Geneva. The JPA, inter alia, stated that the "goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful", and that a Joint Commission would work with the Agency to "facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern."[6]

5. In a joint letter to the Director General dated 13 January 2014, the E3+3 and Iran requested that the Agency "undertake the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities" in relation to the JPA. According to the JPA, the first step would be time-bound (six months) and renewable by mutual consent. The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014.

6. On 20 January 2014, the Director General provided to the Board of Governors a status report on Iran's nuclear programme in relation to the JPA (GOV/INF/2014/1).

7. On 24 January 2014, the Board of Governors took note of the Director General's report on *Monitoring and Verification in the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the Joint Plan of Action*(GOV/2014/2) and

[1] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.
[2] Between September 2003 and September 2012, the Board of Governors adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran (see GOV/2013/56, footnote 2).
[3] Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).
[4] GOV/2013/56, footnote 4.
[5] Part I.A of the Agency's Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11).
[6] GOV/2014/2, para. 3.

endorsed the Agency undertaking monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the JPA, in response to the request by the E3+3 and Iran, subject to the availability of funds.[7]

8. The Agency is now undertaking this monitoring and verification, which involves activities additional to those already being carried out pursuant to Iran's Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions.

9. In response to an invitation from Iran, from 3 to 7 February 2014,the Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, the IR-40 Reactor at Arak, and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant(FMP) and Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan. In addition, he led the Agency's managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.

10. This quarterly report addresses developments since the Director General's previous report (GOV/2013/56), as well as issues of longer standing.[8]

B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues

11. As previously reported, the Board of Governors, in its resolution of November 2011 (GOV/2011/69),stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarificationsregarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In its resolution of September 2012 (GOV/2012/50), the Board of Governors decided that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

12. Pursuant to the Framework for Cooperation, technical meetingswere held in Vienna on 11 December 2013and in Tehran on 8 and 9 February 2014, at which Agency and Iranian officialsreviewed progress on the implementation of the six initial practical measures and agreed on seven practical measures to be implemented by Iran during the next step.

13. Iran has implemented the six initial practical measures as follows:

- On 8 December 2013, Iran provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak.Approximately 100 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy water have been produced at the HWPP since production began in 2006.
- On 29 January 2014, Iran provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information, including that relating to the production and shipping of uranium ore concentrate (UOC),and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas.[9]The Agency was given access to the requested locations on the site.

[7] A number of Member States have indicated that they would make extrabudgetary funds available.
[8] The Director General will provide the Board of Governors with monthly updates on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the JPA, the first of which is contained in Annex III to this report.
[9]At Gchine, Iran operates a mine for the exploitation of uranium, the ore from which is processed at the co-located mill.

- In a letter dated 8 February 2014, Iran informed the Agency that a "10 MW light water pool type research reactor with 20% enriched uranium oxide fuel, is planned to be constructed in order to fulfil the national demand on educational nuclear research, material testing, medical radio isotopes production and other beam line application", and that "the site selection process is still in its preliminary stages."

- In another letter dated 8 February 2014, Iran informed the Agency that it had initiated a project for the identification of "Candidate Areas" for new nuclear power plants. Iran provided the Agency with a list of the 16 "Preferred Candidate Areas," according to criteria related to "safety, environmental, social and economical, and technical factors," as the "potential location for future construction" of such plants.

- In a letter dated 18 January 2014, Iran provided clarification of the announcement it had made previously that it had decided to construct ten additional uranium enrichment facilities. Iran informed the Agency that preliminary site selections for five such facilities had started but not been "finalized" and that the "successful development of new type of gas centrifuge machines" had "provided the timing flexibility before conducting next steps."Iran also stated that "for the first step time-bound (six months), there will be no new location for enrichment other than those already existing at the Fordow and Natanz sites."

- In another letter dated 18 January 2014, Iran provided further clarification of the statementit had made in February 2010 with respect to laser enrichment technology. Iran indicated that this statement was made based on its "past R&D experiences in the field of laser enrichment which ended in 2003" and that since then "there had not been any especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser-based enrichment plants in Iran."

The Agency confirms that Iran has implemented these initial practical measures within the specified three-month period. The Agency is analysing the information provided by Iran and has requested additional clarifications of some of this information.

14. The seven practical measures to be implemented by Iran by 15 May 2014,are as follows:[10]

- Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in Yazd.

- Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan concentration plant.

- Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor.

- Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the IR-40 Reactor.

- Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to LashkarAb'ad Laser Centre.

- Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material and on Iran's extraction of uranium from phosphates.

[10]GOV/INF/2014/3.

- Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran's stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

C. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

15. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 17 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)[11](Annex I). Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs.

D. Enrichment Related Activities

16. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended all of its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. However, since the Director General's previous report, Iran has ceased the production of UF_6enriched above 5% U-235. All of the enrichment related activities at Iran's declared facilities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades, and feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.[12]

17. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities.[13]Iran has also stated that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel for research reactors.[14]

18. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities:

- 11 111 kg (+754 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, of which 7609 kg (+454.7 kg since the Director General's previous report) remain in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235[15] and the rest has been further processed (see Annex II); and

- 447.8 kg (+37.4 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, of which 160.6 kg (–35.4 kg since the Director General's previous report) remain in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the rest has been further processed. On 20 January 2014, Iran ceased the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235and also began downblendingsome of what it had

[11] All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.
[12] In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be subject to containment and surveillance.
[13] As declared by Iran in its DIQs for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.
[14]GOV/2010/10, para. 8; and as declared by Iran in its DIQ for FPFP.
[15] This comprises nuclear material in storage as well as nuclear material in the cold traps and inside cylinders still attached to the enrichment process.

produced into UF_6 enriched to no more than 5% U-235 (as detailed in para. 32 below). The remainder of what it had produced is being converted into uranium oxide (see Annex II).

D.1. Natanz

19. **Fuel Enrichment Plant:** FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by Iran, eight units, each containing 18 cascades, are planned for Production Hall A, which totals approximately 25 000centrifuges in 144 cascades. Currently, one unit contains IR-2m centrifuges;five contain IR-1 centrifuges; and the other two units do not contain centrifuges. Iran has yet to provide the corresponding design information for Production Hall B.

20. In the unit containing IR-2m centrifuges, as of 10 February 2014, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: six cascades had been fully installed with IR-2m centrifuges;[16] none of these cascades had been fed with natural UF_6; and preparatory installation work had been completed for the other 12 IR-2m cascades in the unit.

21. In the five units containing IR-1 centrifuges, as of 10 February 2014,90 cascades had been fully installed,[17] of which 54 were being fed with natural UF_6.As indicated in the Director General's previous report, preparatory installation work had been completedfor 36 IR-1 cascades in the two units not containing centrifuges.

22. On 20 January 2014, the Agency applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that no more than the aforementioned 54 IR-1 cascades are being fed with nuclear material at FEP.

23. As a result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FEP between 19 Octoberand 11 November 2013, the Agency verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 20 October 2013.

24. As of 9 February 2014, Iran had fed 126 815 kg of natural UF_6 into the cascades at FEP since production began in February 2007 and produced a total of 11 091 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.

25. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP,[18] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

26. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant:** PFEP is a pilot LEU production, and research and development (R&D) facility that was first brought into operation in October 2003. It can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated by Iran for the production of UF_6enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated by Iran for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

[16] The number of IR-2m centrifuges installed at FEP (1008) was unchanged from that indicated in the Director General's previous report.

[17] The number of IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (15 420) was unchanged from that indicated in the Director General's previous report.

[18] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 5 June 2013.

27. As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at PFEP between 14 September and 1 October 2013, the Agency verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 15 September 2013.

28. ***Production area:***On 20 January 2014, Iranceased feeding Cascades 1 and 6 with UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235and has since begun feeding the cascades with natural UF_6 instead. Iran is no longer operating these cascades in an interconnected configuration.[19]On the same date, the Agency applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that Cascades 1 and 6 are not interconnected.

29. As of 20 January 2014, when Iran ceased production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, Iran had fed 1630.8 kg of UF_6enriched up to 5% U-235 into Cascades 1 and 6since production began in February 2010 and had produced a total of 201.9 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, all of which has since been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency. Between 20 January 2014 and 9 February 2014, Iran fed 35.0 kg of natural UF_6 into Cascades 1 and 6 at PFEP and produced a total of 4.1 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.

30. ***R&D area:***Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF_6into IR-6s centrifuges as single machines and into IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes.[20] The single installed IR-5 centrifuge has yet to be fed with UF_6.On 4 December 2013, Iran provided the Agency with an updated DIQ in which Iran informed the Agency of its intention to install a single "new centrifuge",referred to by Iran as an "IR-8",in the R&D area. Since 15 December 2013, the Agency has observed a new "casing", which isinplacebut without connections.

31. Between 26 October 2013 and 9 February 2014, a total of approximately 430.1 kg of natural UF_6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.

32. On 20 January 2014, Iranbegan downblendingsome of its inventory of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP. As of 9 February 2014, Iran had downblended22.9 kg of such material to produce UF_6 enriched to no more than 5% U-235.

33. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at PFEP,[21]and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

D.2. Fordow

34. **Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant:**FFEP is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012, a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF_6enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[22]The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, is designed to contain up to 2976

[19] As of 15 February 2014, Cascades 1 and 6 contained a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges (unchanged from that indicated in the Director General's previous report).

[20] On 15 February 2014, there were 11 IR-4 centrifuges, seven IR-6 centrifuges, one IR-6s centrifuge and one IR-5 centrifuge installed in Cascade 2; 14 IR-1 centrifuges installed in Cascade 3; 164 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4; and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.

[21] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 31 August 2013.

[22]GOV/2009/74, paras7 and 14; GOV/2012/9, para. 24. Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs with different stated purposes for FFEP. In light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used, additional information from Iran is still required.

centrifuges in 16 cascades, divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2. To date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.On 8 February 2014, Iran provided an update to parts of the DIQ in which it stated that it had taken measures "due to change in level of enrichment" and that the measures "are temporarily taken during the first step implementation of the JPA."

35. On 20 January 2014, Iran ceased feeding UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235into the four cascades of Unit 2 previously used for this purpose and has since begun feeding them with natural UF_6 instead. Iran is no longer operating these cascades in an interconnected configuration.None of the other 12 cascades in FFEPhad been fed with UF_6.[23]

36. On 20 January 2014, the Agency applied additional containment and surveillance measures at FFEP to confirm that only the aforementioned four IR-1 cascades are used to enrich UF_6 and that the four cascades are not interconnected.

37. Between 23 and 27 November 2013, the Agency conducted a PIV at FFEP, the results of which are now being evaluated by the Agency.

38. Between 18 January and 2 February 2014, the Agency conducted another PIV at FFEP to verify the inventory as declared by Iran on 20 January 2014, the results of which are now being evaluated by the Agency.

39. As of 20 January 2014, Iran had fed 1806 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the cascades at FFEP since production began in December 2011 and had produced a total of 245.9 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, all of which has since been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency. Between 20 January 2014 and 9 February 2014, Iran fed 144 kg of natural UF_6 into the cascades at FFEP and produced a total of 15.8 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.

40. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,[24]and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

41. As indicated above (para. 9), in early February the Deputy Director General led the Agency's managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.[25] In a letter to the Agency dated 20 January 2014, Iran provided information on the location of these workshops and facilities. In a letter dated 12 February 2014, Iran also provided the Agency with an inventory of centrifuge rotor assemblies to be used to replace those centrifuges that fail. The Agency is analysing the information provided by Iran and has requested additional clarifications of some of this information.

[23] The number of centrifuges installed at FFEP (2710) was unchanged from that indicated in the Director General's previous report.

[24] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 18 September 2013.

[25] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

E. Reprocessing Activities

42. Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.[26]In a letter dated 18 January 2014, Iran stated that "during the first step time-bound (six months), Iran will not engage in stages of reprocessing activities, or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing."[27]

43. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)[28] and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.[29] The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 9 February 2014, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on10 February 2014. The Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access in Iran.

F. Heavy Water Related Projects

44. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects.[30]However, since the Director General's previous report, Iran has not installed any major components at the IR-40 Reactor.

45. **IR-40 Reactor:** The IR-40 Reactor, which is under Agency safeguards, is a 40 MW heavy water moderated research reactor designed to contain 150 fuel assemblies containing natural uranium in the form of UO_2.

46. As of 20 January 2014, Iranhad ceased the production of nuclear fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactorat FMP (see para. 57 below).

47. On 12 February 2014, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor and observed that, since the Director General's previous report, none of the reactor's remaining major components had been installed.[31]On the same date, in line with its undertaking under the Framework for Cooperation (see para. 13 above), Iran submitted an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor. Iran has also agreed to take steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the IR-40 Reactor.

48. **Heavy Water Production Plant:** The HWPP is a facility for the production of heavy water with a design capacity to produce 16 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy water per year.

49. Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has continued the production of heavy water at the HWPP. Although the HWPP is not under Agency safeguards, the plant was subject to managed access by the

[26]GOV/2013/56, footnote 28.
[27] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.
[28] TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.
[29] The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR.
[30]GOV/2013/56, footnote 32.
[31] GOV/2013/56, para. 34.

Agency on 8 December 2013 (as indicated in para. 13 above). During the managed access, Iran also provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information. In addition, access to the heavy water storage location at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan has enabled the Agency to characterize the heavy water.[32]

G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

50. Iranis conducting a number of activities at UCF,the Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP),FMP and FPFP at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of its obligationsto suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, notwithstanding that the facilities are under Agency safeguards.

51. Since Iran began conversion and fuel fabrication at its declared facilities, it has, inter alia:

- Produced 550 tonnes of natural UF_6 at UCF, of which 146 tonnes have been transferred to FEP.
- Fed into the R&D conversion process at UCF 53 kg of UF_6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 and produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2.[33]
- Fed into the conversion process at FPFP 262.7 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (+49.2 kg since the Director General's previous report) and produced120.6 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8.
- Transferred to TRR20fuel assemblies containing uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 and two fuel assemblies containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235.

52. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** UCF is a conversion facility for the production of both natural $UF_6$and natural UO_2 from UOC. It is planned that UCF will alsoproduce uranium metal ingots from natural and depleted UF_4, and produce UF_4 from depleted UF_6.

53. Iran has continuedto conduct R&D conversion activitiesusing LEU compounds for the production of UO_2. Iran has declared that, as of 7 February 2014,it had produced 13.8 tonnes of natural uranium in the form of UO_2 through the conversion of UOC.[34]The Agency has verified that, as ofthe same date, Iran had transferred 13.2 tonnesof natural uranium in the form of $UO_2$to FMP.

54. **Enriched UO_2Powder Plant:**EUPP is a facility for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235into UO_2 powder.[35]On 10 February 2014, the Agency conducted a DIV at EUPP during which it confirmed thatthe facility had yet to commence operation. In a letter dated 14 February 2014, the Agency requested that Iran provide an updated operational schedule for the commissioning of EUPP. Iran has yet to reply.

55. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:**FMP is a facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for power and research reactors (see Annex II).

[32] GOV/2013/56, para. 39.
[33] GOV/2012/55, para. 35.
[34] This amount only refers to material qualified for fuel fabrication.
[35]GOV/2013/40, para. 45.

56. As a result of the PIV and DIV carried out by the Agency between 1and 3 September 2013, the Agency verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 31 August 2013.

57. On 10 and 12 February 2014 respectively, the Agency conducted a DIV and an inspection at FMP and verified that Iran had ceased the production of nuclear fuel assemblies using natural $UO_2$for the IR-40 Reactor and that all of the fuel assemblies that had been produced previously remained at FMP.

58. **Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant:**FPFP is a facility for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U_3O_8 (see Annex II).

59. As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at FPFP between 9 and 11 September 2013, the Agency verified, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 9 September 2013.

60. In a letter dated 18 January 2014, Iran stated that "during the first step of time-bound (six months), Iran declares that there is no reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235."[36]On 15 and 16 February 2014 respectively, the Agency conducted a DIV and an inspection at FPFP during which it confirmed that the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 was ongoing and that there was no process line at the plant for the reconversion of oxides into UF_6.

61. The Agency has verified that, as of 16 February 2014, Iran had fed a total of 262.7 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (177.4 kg of uranium) into the conversion process of FPFPand had produced 120.6 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8. The Agency also verified that 36.8 kg of uranium were contained in solid and liquid scrap. The remainder of the uranium that was fed into the processremains in the process andin waste.

62. The Agency has verified that, as of 15 February 2014, Iran had produced at FPFP one experimental fuel assembly and 25 TRR-type fuel assemblies. Twenty of these fuel assemblies, including the experimental assembly, had been transferred to TRR.

H. Possible Military Dimensions

63. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.[37]The Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to

[36] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[37] For example: GOV/2011/65, paras 38–45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.

concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.[38]

64. The Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible.[39]Iran has dismissed the Agency's concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considers them to be based on unfounded allegations.[40]The Agency has obtained more information since November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex.

65. As indicated above (para. 3), the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues. The seven practical measures to be implemented in the second step of the Framework for Cooperation include the provision of "information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran's stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators."[41]

66. The Agency continues to seek answers from Iran to the detailed questions provided to Iran regarding Parchinand the foreign expert,[42]and to requestaccess to a particular location at theParchin site.[43] Since the Agency's first request for access, extensive activities have taken place at this location that will have seriously undermined the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification.[44]

67. Since the Director General's previous report, the Agency has observed through satellite imagery what appears to be possible building material and debrisat the location of interest.

I. Design Information

68. As indicated above (para. 47), on 12 February 2014, Iran provided the Agency with an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor.

[38]Security Council resolution 1929, paras 2 and 3.
[39]GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B.
[40]GOV/2012/9, para. 8.
[41] The Agency's need to clarify Iran's possible activities in relation to exploding bridgewire detonators is set out in GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C.
[42]GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C; GOV/2012/23, para. 5.
[43] The Agency has information provided by Member States indicating that Iran had constructed a large explosives containment vessel (chamber) at this location in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. Such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development (GOV/2011/65, Annex, paras 49–51).
[44] For a list of the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location between February 2012 and the publication of the Director General's May 2013 report, see GOV/2012/55, para. 44, GOV/2013/6, para. 52 and GOV/2013/27, para. 55.

69. Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,Iran is required to implement the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provision of design information.[45]

J. Additional Protocol

70. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and untilIran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.[46]

K. Other Matters

71. On9 February 2014, the Agency confirmed that seven fuel assemblies which had been produced in Iran and which contain uranium that was enriched in Iran up to 20% U-235were in the core of TRR.[47]On the same date, the Agency observed that the Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly was in the storage pool.[48]

72. As of 10 February 2014, one fuel plate containing a mixture of U_3O_8 (up to 20% enriched) and aluminiumwas present at the MIX facility, having been transferred from FPFP, and was being used for R&D activities aimed at optimizingthe production of ^{99}Mo, ^{133}Xe and ^{132}I isotopes.[49]

73. On 19 February 2014, the Agency conductedan inspectionat the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, at which timethe reactor was shut down for refueling.

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[45] In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had suspended implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/INF/2007/8). In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative para.5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

[46] Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

[47] On 9 February 2014, the core of TRR comprised a total of 33 fuel assemblies.

[48] GOV/2013/40, para. 64.

[49] GOV/2013/40, para. 65.

L. Summary

74. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[50]

75. Iran has implemented, within the specified three-month period, the six initial practical measures contained in the Annex to the Framework for Cooperation. The Agency is analysing the information provided by Iran and has requested additional clarifications of some of this information.

76. During the technical meeting in Tehran on 8 and 9 February 2014, the Agency and Iran agreed on the next seven practical measures to be implemented by 15 May 2014. The agreement included one measure related to the information contained in the Annex to the Director General's report of November 2011.

77. Upon request from the E3+3 and Iran, and with the endorsement of the Board of Governors, the Agency has started to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the measures set out in the JPA.

78. The measures implemented by Iran and the further commitments it has undertaken represent a positive step forward, but much remains to be done to resolve all outstanding issues.

79. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

[50]The Board of Governors has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that para. 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49 and GOV/OR.865, paras 53–54).

List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOFs in Iran

Tehran:

1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility
3. JabrIbn Hayan MultipurposeLaboratories (JHL)

Esfahan:

4. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
5. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
6. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
7. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
8. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
9. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
10. Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP)

Natanz:

11. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
12. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Fordow:

13. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Arak:

14. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor)

Karaj:

15. Karaj Waste Storage

Bushehr:

16. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)

Darkhovin:

17. 360 MW Nuclear Power Plant

LOFs:

Nine (all situated within hospitals)

Table 1: Summary of UF_6 Production and Flows

	Date	Quantity	Enrichment
Produced at UCF	8 February 2014	550 000 kg	Natural
Fed into FEP, PFEP and FFEP	9 February 2014	126 994 kg	Natural
Produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP	9 February 2014	11 111 kg	Up to 5%
Fed into PFEP	20 January 2014	1630.8 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at PFEP	20 January 2014	201.9 kg	Up to 20%
Fed into FFEP	20 January 2014	1806.0 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at FFEP	20 January 2014	245.9 kg	Up to 20%

Table 2: Inventory of UF_6Enriched up to 20% U-235

Produced at FFEP and PFEP	447.8 kg
Fed into conversion process	262.7 kg
Downblended	24.5 kg*
Stored as UF_6	160.6 kg

* The figure includes 1.6 kg that was previously downblended (GOV/2012/55, para. 10).

Table 3: Conversion at UCF

Conversion process	Quantity produced	Transferred to FMP
UF_6 (~3.4% U-235) into UO_2	24 kg U	24 kg U
Natural UOC into UO_2	13 792 kg U*	13 229 kg U

* Uranium content in material qualified for fuel fabrication.

Table 4: Fuel Manufacturing at FMP

Item	Number produced	Enrichment	Item mass (g U)	Number irradiated
Test fuel rod for IR-40 Reactor	3	Natural uranium	500	1
Test fuel rod	2	3.4%	500	-
Fuel rod assembly	2	3.4%	6 000	1
Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly	1	Natural uranium	10 000	1
IR-40 prototype fuel assembly	36	Natural uranium	35 500	Not applicable
IR-40 fuel assembly	11	Natural uranium	56 500	-

Table 5: Conversion of UF_6Enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 at FPFP

Feed quantity	Quantity produced
262.7 kg of UF_6 (177.3 kg U)	120.6 kg U of U_3O_8

Table 6: TRR Fuel Fabrication at FPFP

Item	Number produced	Enrichment	Item mass (g U)	Present at TRR	Irradiated
TRRtest plate (Natural Uranium)	4	Natural uranium	5	2	1
TRRtest plate	5	19%	75	5	2
TRRcontrol fuel element	7	19%	1 000	5	4
TRRstandard fuel element	18	19%	1 400	14	5
Test assembly (with 8 plates)	1	19%	550	1	-

Update on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the Joint Plan of Action agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013

The Agency confirms that, as of 20 February 2014, Iran:

1. is not enriching uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;
2. is not operating cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;
3. is continuing to dilute UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP;[51]
4. is continuing the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 at FPFP;[52]
5. has no process line to reconvert uranium oxides enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at FPFP;
6. has not conducted "any further advances" to its activities at FEP, FFEP or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;
7. has provided an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor and has agreed to take steps to agree on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the reactor;
8. is continuing to construct the EUPP for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into oxide and, therefore, has yet to begin converting to oxide UF_6 "newly enriched" up to 5% U-235;
9. is continuing its "safeguarded R&D practices" at PFEP, including its "current enrichment R&D practices", and continues not to use these "practices" for the accumulation of enriched uranium;
10. is not carrying out reprocessing related activities at the TRR and the MIX Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;
11. has provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine;
12. has permitted daily access to the nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow; and
13. has provided managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon.

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[51] The amount of nuclear material that remained in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 on 20 January 2014 was 209.1 kg, half of which Iran has undertaken to dilute to UF_6 enriched to no more than 5% U-235 and the remainder of which it has undertaken to convert into oxide.

[52] See preceding footnote.

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Letter dated 20 February 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 17 February 2014 from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Thank you very much for your letter dated 14 February 2014 on the situation in the Central African Republic. Your prompt reply to my letter of 13 February 2014 is further testimony to the profound preoccupation of the United Nations family as a whole and your personal commitment to do whatever you can to help strengthen the international response to the dire and complex situation prevailing in the Central African Republic. The words of appreciation for the efforts of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) and recognition of the very positive impact MISCA has already made are a source of encouragement for the African Union. We are determined to persevere in our efforts, in line with the relevant provisions of the African Union Constitutive Act and the underlying principle of non-indifference.

As you rightly pointed out, we have a pressing responsibility to scale up our efforts in order to guarantee the protection of the civilian population and ensure the safe and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance. No day should be lost in this endeavour. While the international community has not been able to prevent, as it should have, the descent of the Central African Republic into a situation of widespread violence, it is a moral and political imperative to prevent further chaos and suffering for the people of the Central African Republic. I cannot but echo your call regarding the obligation for all of us to act with renewed vigour to stop the gravest threats to the population. It is within this context that, upon the transfer of authority to MISCA, the African Union took immediate steps to enhance the troops on the ground, with the deployment within a month of two additional battalions, thanks to the support of the United States of America, which ensured their airlift.

Given the imperative of expediting the stabilization process in the Central African Republic, averting further killings and creating conditions for the safe return of those communities that were forced to flee, it is critical that we work out a common approach on how best we can effectively address the challenges at hand. In formulating such an approach, we need to be guided by considerations of practicality, in order to ensure that our efforts concretely mitigate the situation on the ground; flexibility, so as to be responsive to the exigencies of the situation; and creativity, to enable the international community to devise, as needed, innovative approaches to maximize the impact of its intervention.

In so doing, we should of necessity build on the ongoing efforts by MISCA with the support of the French Sangaris operation. Recognizing that the main security threat is currently posed by the anti-Balaka militias and their criminal attacks on innocent civilians, MISCA and Sangaris have already started joint operations to neutralize this armed group. These efforts will be intensified over the coming days.

Steps have also been taken to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is in this context that MISCA has put in place arrangements to secure the vital corridor linking the Central African Republic to Cameroon. Over the past few weeks, MISCA has escorted and protected several humanitarian and other convoys using this route, including trucks belonging to the World Food Programme. Beyond the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the objective is also to ensure the resumption of trade flow, as well as the full control by the Central African Republic authorities of the sources of revenue of their country through the effective collection of the customs duties and related taxes levied on goods destined to the Central African Republic. As you are aware, over the past few months, the

armed groups have set up numerous illegal roadblocks that impede trade and deprive the Central African Republic authorities of the very resources they need to perform the core functions of the State.

I would also like to inform you that MISCA is about to complete its deployment plan in the countryside. While recognizing that the sheer size of the Central African Republic territory and the widespread nature of the violence make the task of the international forces extremely challenging, we strongly believe that no effort should be spared to ensure that those at risk are afforded the basic protection they so desperately need.

In the report due to be submitted by the African Union to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 32 of resolution 2127 (2013), we will provide more detailed information on the situation on the ground as we assess it, as well as on our efforts, the results achieved so far and the challenges that continue to lie ahead. I hope that our contribution will assist the Council as it considers further steps to deal with the situation in the light of the report of the United Nations assessment mission mandated in paragraph 48 of resolution 2127 (2013).

In terms of the way forward, allow me to start by stressing that I concur with you on the fact that the continued role of MISCA, bolstered by additional African troops and capabilities, such as mobility, is vital to the accomplishment of our shared objectives. More specifically, taking note of your intention to set forth a proposal on how the international community should address the situation and in response to your invitation for ideas on the matter prior to the meeting of the Security Council scheduled to take place on 18 February 2014, I have attached herewith a set of proposals (see enclosure).

I would also like to stress how important it is for the international community, notably the United Nations, to fully support African endeavours driven by a strong regional and continental commitment. On the situation in the Central African Republic, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has demonstrated proactivity and leadership. The African Union has also remained continuously engaged. It is in the interest of all of us to ensure that Africans play the necessary leadership role and assume the responsibilities involved, for without African leadership and ownership, there can be no lasting solutions to the myriad of peace and security challenges that continue to beset our continent.

In conclusion, I take note of your invitation for the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smaïl Chergui, to attend the consultations scheduled to take place ahead of the Security Council meeting of 18 February 2014. Unfortunately, in view of the short notice and prior engagements in the context of the Nouakchott Process on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Sahara region, with meetings scheduled to take place in Niamey from 17 to 19 February 2014, it has not been possible for Ambassador Chergui to be in New York on time. In the light of these developments, I hope the present letter will assist you in your presentation to the Security Council and could be shared with all the members of the Council, including the enclosure.

Permit me also to emphasize the critical relevance of conflict prevention as we address other peace and security challenges on the continent, so that we are not faced with catastrophe situations before we act.

(*Signed*) **Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma**

Enclosure

African Union proposals on the enhancement of international action in the Central African Republic

These proposals are informed by the African Union assessment of the situation on the ground and by the relevant decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council. They are as follows:

Strengthening of MISCA

The Mission has almost reached its current authorized strength of 6,000 military, police and civilian personnel. However, there is a need for additional police personnel, particularly formed police units, to ensure a better balance in the Mission's uniformed personnel, in order to deal more effectively with issues of law and order, including through close interaction with the civilian population. The African Union is also prepared, as needed, to deploy additional troops to ensure a greater presence on the ground. In the meantime, and bearing in mind the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General regarding the delivery of humanitarian assistance outside Bangui, MISCA will take steps to protect, as necessary, humanitarian convoys destined to the countryside, as the Mission is indeed already doing along the corridor linking the Central African Republic to Cameroon. The Mission will also continue to facilitate the movement of humanitarian convoys in the countryside.

As stated in the Chairperson's letter of 13 February 2014, a number of African countries are ready to provide troops and police personnel. What is needed is logistical and financial support to ensure the deployment of these uniformed personnel and their sustenance, as well as the provision of equipment required in critical areas. It is the hope of the African Union that the international community, driven as it is by a legitimate sense of urgency and a determination to rapidly improve the situation across the country, will be able to urgently provide the immediate support required for the enhancement of MISCA. The African Union will submit a list of the most urgent needs of the Mission.

For the avoidance of any doubt, it is important to reiterate the position of the African Union on the possible introduction of an additional international force in the form of a "coalition of the willing", as contained in the Chairperson's letter of 13 February 2014. The African Union believes that such an initiative will not be helpful.

Expeditious deployment of the European Union operation in the Central African Republic as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2134 (2014)

This will ease the pressure on the international forces currently on the ground, allowing them to enhance the effectiveness of their ongoing efforts and focus as appropriate on other pressing tasks. The African Union would like to reiterate its call for the European Union to use the opportunity of this operation to provide targeted support to MISCA in a number of areas, as per the consultations the Commission and the European Union had in the lead-up to the adoption of resolution 2134 (2014).

Streamlining command and control

The African Union takes note of the observations made regarding the issue of command and control. Efforts are being expedited to strengthen the command and control structure of MISCA, notably through the proper staffing of its Mission and Force headquarters. At the same time, there is a need to enhance coordination among the different international forces operating on the ground, bearing in mind that both the Sangaris and the European Union operations are mandated to support MISCA. The African Union is ready to host a meeting in Bangui to work out the details of the coordination mechanisms that are required.

Mobilization of more predictable and sustainable support for MISCA

The African Union would like to express its utmost appreciation for the Secretary-General's intention to advocate for a support package for MISCA troops that would include direct logistic support, as well as reimbursement for heavy equipment, funded from the United Nations assessed contributions. In order to move forward, it is proposed that the African Union Peace and Security Department and the relevant United Nations Secretariat Departments, in close consultation with the ECCAS secretariat and other stakeholders, urgently and jointly start working on a strategic concept that would articulate a comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing the crisis in the Central African Republic. Such a concept will build on the lessons learned from the elaboration, in October 2012, by the African Union in coordination with the United Nations and other partners, of a strategic concept for the resolution of the Malian crisis, which was aimed at facilitating a coordinated approach to the situation then obtaining in the country, as well as the provision of more predictable United Nations support.

The proposed support package should be predicated on the fact that MISCA will transition to a United Nations operation in due course, once the required conditions on the ground have been created. The African Union has consistently made it clear that the role of MISCA is to facilitate a broader and more sustainable international engagement in the Central African Republic by successfully undertaking the initial stabilization phase of the situation. It is our hope that, within the next six to nine months, this process will be completed, laying the ground for the next phase in our joint efforts, in which the peacekeeping function will be performed by the United Nations. The precise time frame will be determined based on regular joint African Union-United Nations assessments of the situation and benchmarking exercises against clearly identified indicators.

The African Union would like to seize this opportunity to stress that as part of the broader international engagement alluded to above, the role of the region and the African Union should be clearly recognized and supported, so that the United Nations peacekeeping and other related efforts can be anchored on a strong regional and continental involvement, building on the respective comparative advantages of all the international actors concerned. It is also critical that in the envisaged transition process, we learn from the Mali experience. The African Union will elaborate further on these issues while they are being dealt with by the Security Council in the context of the report of the United Nations assessment mission referred to in the letter.

Payment of salaries and re-establishment of basic State functions

As part of the immediate steps required to stabilize the situation, the international community should pay due attention to the payment of salary arrears due to civil servants and the pension for retirees. Indeed, the deepening economic crisis arising from the conflict in the Central African Republic has torn apart the social fabric of the country and created conditions conducive to criminal acts such as looting. We are absolutely convinced that addressing this issue, and doing so urgently, will significantly contribute to the consolidation of the security gains made by MISCA and the Sangaris operation. Equally important is the need for the State to be in a position to exercise its most basic functions. Over the past few weeks, one of the most frustrating experiences of MISCA has been the total collapse of the criminal justice system. Indeed, many of those apprehended because of their involvement in criminal activities, such as looting and attacks against civilians, could not be kept in custody, much less prosecuted, in the absence of the required judicial structures. The resources needed to address these two issues are modest compared with those required for the deployment of international forces.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as repatriation, in the case of foreign fighters

The immediate start of this programme will spur and enhance the process of disarming the rest of the ex-Séléka groups.

Review of the political process

There will be no sustainable military and security gains if they are not accompanied by an inclusive political process geared towards reconciliation and the early restoration of constitutional order through the holding of free, fair and transparent elections. From the African Union perspective, the role of the international community should be to extend firm support to ECCAS, through its Chair, President Idriss Deby Itno, and the Chair of the ECCAS Follow-up Committee on the Central African Republic, President Denis Sassou Nguesso. They have demonstrated exemplary leadership and commitment, as illustrated by the ECCAS Extraordinary Summit held in N'Djamena on 9 and 10 January 2014. Of particular importance is the reconciliation conference provided for in the communiqué of the Summit. United Nations support in this respect will be critical.

It is proposed to take advantage of the next meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic, scheduled to take place in Brazzaville, to give a new impetus to the international support to the political process in the Central African Republic. The African Union intends to initiate immediately consultations with all concerned for the early convening of this meeting.

The African Union would also like to highlight two additional issues that are critical to its ongoing efforts to stem violence and facilitate the early stabilization of the situation, as they will act as a deterrent to further acts of violence and attempts to undermine the search for lasting peace and reconciliation in the country. These relate to:

(1) The work of the International Commission of Inquiry put in place on 22 January 2014 in order to immediately investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human

rights in the Central African Republic by all parties since 1 January 2013: As requested by the Peace and Security Council communiqué of 29 January 2014, MISCA has been directed to extend full cooperation to the Commission and to make available to it any relevant information in its possession. We encourage the Commission to carry out its work with the required sense of urgency;

(2) The issue of sanctions against individuals and entities as spelled out in the relevant provisions of resolution 2134 (2014): It is of utmost importance and urgency that these sanctions be put into effect. We look forward to the early designation of the individuals and entities concerned. The African Union is reviewing its list of individuals targeted by sanctions, particularly with a view to including in it individuals linked to the anti-Balaka group. Close coordination between the African Union and the United Nations is paramount in this respect. In the meantime, MISCA has been directed to lend full support and cooperation to the Security Council Committee and Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013).